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1 
Immanuel Kant 
and the Development 
of Modern Psychology 
David E. Leary 
Few thinkers in the history of Western civilization have had as 
broad and lasting an impact as Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). This 
"Sage of Konigsberg" spent his entire life within the confines of East 
Prussia, but his thoughts traveled freely across Europe and, in time, 
to America, where their effects are still apparent. An untold number 
of analyses and commentaries have established Kant as a preeminent 
epistemologist, philosopher of science, moral philosopher, aestheti-
cian, and metaphysician. He is even recognized as a natural historian 
and cosmologist: the author of the so-called Kant-Laplace hypothesis 
regarding the origin of the universe. He is less often credited as 
a "psychologist," "anthropologist," or "philosopher of mind," to 
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use terms whose currency postdated his time.1 Nonetheless, the thesis 
of this essay is that Immanuel Kant laid the foundation for later 
developments in the broad field of inquiry that had already been 
labeled "psychology." 
KANT'S BACKGROUND 
The details of Kant's life are not important for the story we have 
to tell. To be sure, the social historical context of his life is not 
without relevance: not even Immanuel Kant could, or would have 
wanted to, escape the formative and directive influence of his time. 
The general social, political, and economic features of the late 
Enlightenment period, culminating in the French Revolution and 
its aftermath, provided a necessary backdrop against which Kant 
developed his philosophical, and indeed his psychological, point 
of view. At the same time, Kant's personal relationship to the tradi-
tion of religious Pietism was a significant factor in his willingness 
to consider the less-than-rational aspects of human functioning. 
Still, everything considered, by far the most relevant context for 
understanding his work is provided by the intellectual culture to 
which he belonged. For our present purposes, a brief discussion of 
the work of four representatives of this culture-Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz (1646-1716), Christian Wolff (1679-1754), Johann Nicolas 
Tetens (1736/38-1807), and Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-
1762)-will reasonably portray the background of Kant's psycho-
logical deliberations. 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, one of the other intellectual giants 
in Western history, set the scene for the development of a distinctive 
German tradition of thought. Although it was left for Wolff and 
others to establish fully the period of German Enlightenment, it 
was Leibniz who bequeathed many of its philosophical principles 
and posited a number of the doctrines that retained vitality through-
out this period. Furthermore, the posthumous publication of Leibniz's 
works served to keep his thought alive and influential long after his 
death. Indeed, one such posthumous publication, Leibniz's Nouveau 
Essais sur l'entendement humain (New Essays Concerning Human 
Understanding) (1975), had a tangible impact on German thought and 
in particular on Kant. Originally written in response to John Locke's 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), and withheld from 
publication when Locke died in 1704, this treatise stimulated Kant's 
thinking by its postulation of a crucial distinction between sensibility 
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and understanding, that is, between the "material" sensations received 
from the world and the "formal" classification of these sensations by 
the mind. The influence of this distinction was clearly evident in 
Kant's De Mundi Sensibilis atque lntelligibilis Forma et Principiis 
(Concerning the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible 
World) (1779), which was the dissertation Kant delivered upon his in-
auguration to the chair of philosophy at Konigsberg. This work was 
not only the symbolic starting point of Kant's so-called "critical 
period," it was also an important manifestation of Kant's acceptance 
of the "Leibnizian" principle of the formative activity of the mind 
(as opposed to the much more passive empiricist-oriented model of 
the mind that Kant had been considering not long before). 2 From 
this time forward, Kant developed his own philosophy and psychol-
ogy, going beyond the bounds proposed even by Leibniz. 
As Kant went beyond the thought of Leibniz, he also went 
beyond that of Christian Wolff, whom Kant considered the intellectual 
"preceptor of Germany." Wolff made his historical mark by synthe-
sizing many of Leibniz's ideas within a grand system that also included 
elements from other sources as well as his own original insights and 
doctrines. Although his system was important for many reasons, the 
portion of it dedicated to psychology is of primary interest to us. 
The major significance of this portion is its dualistic nature: Wolff 
divided his psychology into two parts. On the basis of this division, 
made in the early 1730s, two relatively separable traditions of 
psychology began to develop in Germany-the tradition of rational 
psychology and the tradition of empirical psychology. Although 
twentieth-century historians of psychology invariably trace these two 
traditions to the works of Rene Descartes and John Locke respec-
tively, in point of fact it was Christian Wolff who first clearly distin-
guished, defined, and established rational and empirical psychology 
as separate fields of intellectual inquiry. 
In his Psychologia Empirica (Empirical Psychology) (1732) 
Wolff defined empirical psychology as the science of what ex-
perience teaches us about the soul. In other words, he said, it is an 
inductive science that leads to empirical generalizations about the 
soul and its activities. In contrast, he argued in his Psychologia Ra-
tionalis (Rational Psychology) (1734), rational psychology is the 
science of all that is possible to the human soul (as opposed to 
all that has actually happened to it). It is a branch of metaphysics, 
a demonstrative science that provides necessarily true statements 
regarding the nature and essence of the soul. In short, it gives rational 
explanations for the facts accumulated in empirical psychology. Thus 
rational psychology completes empirical psychology; and conversely, 
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empirical psychology (along with metaphysics and cosmology) is 
one of the foundations of rational psychology.3 
The notable point here is that Wolff clearly distinguished two 
different kinds of psychology, one of them independent from 
philosophy and the other a branch of philosophy. Although Wolff's 
empirical and rational psychologies overlapped in practice far more 
than his theoretical definitions implied, Wolff did, in fact, stimulate 
the development of two traditions that became increasingly separable 
over time; as a consequence, when Immanuel Kant surveyed psychol-
ogy a half century later, his critical assessment and reformulation 
of psychology took place within the context of this dualistic vision 
of psychology bequeathed to him by Christian Wolff. 
Of course, by Kant's time, other authors had replaced Wolff 
as the authorities on empirical and rational psychology.4 In the realm 
of empirical psychology (or Erfabrungsseelenlehre, as it came to be 
designated in Germany), the most important authority was Johann 
Nicolas Tetens. Among his major contributions, Tetens' espousal of 
a tripartite faculty psychology (or Vermogenpsychologie) was 
particularly relevant to Kant's psychological thinking. Although 
there were additional reasons for Kant's conversion to a three-faculty 
psychology, Tetens' empirical psychology was at least strongly 
corroborative, as reflected in the fact that hisPhilosophische Versuche 
uber menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung (Philosophical Essays 
on Human Nature and Its Development) (1777) lay open before 
Kant as he was working out the fundamental concepts of his critical 
philosophy. The philosophical significance of this tripartite division 
of psychological faculties is most clearly evident in the similarly 
trifurcated presentation of Kant's thought in his three major works-
the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason) (1781), 
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Critique of Practical Reason) (1788), 
and Kritik der Urtheilskraft (Critique of Judgment) (1790). As Kant 
himself tells us, the tripartite division of these works reflects the 
psychological division between knowing, willing, and feeling. Similarly, 
Kant relied on this threefold division throughout his own psychological 
work, as for instance in his Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht 
(Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View) (1798). 5 None-
theless, despite this and other involvements with the doctrines 
of empirical psychology, Kant was keenly aware, as we shall see, of 
the limitations of this field of inquiry. 
In the realm of rational psychology, perhaps the most important 
test for Kant-and for his subsequent critique of psychology-was 
found in Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's treatise on Metaphysica 
(Metaphysics) (1739). This very popular work which went through 
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numerous editions, was used by Kant throughout his teaching career. 
Although the works of other authors offered additional materials, 
Baumgarten's text provided Kant with some of his best examples of the 
major lines of argument of late eighteenth-century rational psychol-
ogists. As was typical, these rational arguments led to confident asser-
tions on the soul's ontological substantiality, simplicity, identity, and 
relation to the physical world, especially the body.6 As we shall 
see, Kant, came to the conclusion that all these assertions, as well 
as ar.y other assertions that might be made about the essential nature 
of the soul, were logically fallacious and inevitably groundless. As 
a consequence, he began the formal, published presentation of his 
views on psychology with a resounding denial of the validity of 
rational psychology. Soon after, he extended his critique to the 
problematic character of empirical psychology. 
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOLOGY 
The first installment of Kant's critique of psychology appeared in his 
famous Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781). Among the many things 
that Kant attempted to accomplish in this work was a systematic 
critique of rational psychology, and not only that of Baumgarten: 
according to Kant, no attempt to ascertain the nature of the soul -
or thinking subject-by means of rational analysis can possibly 
withstand criticism.7 
Although Kant's specific arguments against the validity of 
rational psychology varied from the first to the second (1787) 
edition of Kritik der reinen Vernunft, his general argument remained 
the same and was quite simple. To know the nature of the soul, 
or the "I," he argued, is beyond the power of human reason. There 
can be no purely rational knowledge of the soul. All arguments 
about the soul's substantiality, simplicity, identity, and relation 
to the physical world ultimately begin with "the single proposition 
'I think'. " 8 And this proposition is empirical, not rational. It is 
based upon a posteriori experience rather than a priori reason, and 
experience can never provide a basis for a purely rational and certain 
proof of the nature of the soul. Just because there is an empirical "I" 
in every act of thought, for instance, does not prove that this "I" is 
substantial, or that it is identical from one thought to another, or 
that it is simple. Nothing about the essence of the "I" follows 
necessarily from its existence. And even granting, as Kant did, that 
there must be a noumenal "I" to account for the a priori possibility 
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of knowledge, no attribute other than existence can validly be 
predicated of this "I." Any other attribute, such as substantiality, 
would be drawn invalidly from the realm of experience. Therefore, 
Kant concluded, since rational psychology is "a science surpassing 
all powers of human reason," there is nothing left for us "but to 
study our soul under the guidance of experience, and to confine 
ourselves to those questions which do not go beyond the limits 
within which a content can be provided for them by possible inner 
experience. " 9 In other words, Kant concluded that psychology can 
only be an empirical science. 
With this conclusion Kant was ready to enter the second phase 
of his critique of psychology, the phase in which he analyzed the 
scientific status of empirical psychology. He published the results of 
this critical analysis in the preface of his Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde 
der Naturwissenschaft (Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science) 
(1786), a work in which he elaborated his own "Newtonian" 
conception of natural science. It was against this same conception 
that Kant measured the possibility of a scientific psychology. 
Again his conclusion was negative: psychology-or "the empirical 
doctrine of the soul"-can never become "a natural science proper"; 
it can "never become anything more than a historical . . . natural 
doctrine of the internal sense." As a consequence, it can only 
provide "a natural description of the [phenomena of the] soul, but 
not a science [i.e., demonstrative knowledge] of the soul." 10 
The reason psychology could never become a "natural science 
proper" according to Kant was that it could not be based upon 
a priori principles and thus could not yield apodictic, or certain, 
knowledge. More specifically, psychology could not utilize mathe-
matics, which provides the necessary means for the a priori construc-
tion of concepts in science. According to Kant, "in every special 
doctrine of nature only so much science proper can be found as 
there is mathematics in it." Mathematics is the "pure [a priori] part 
[of science], which lies at the foundation of the empirical part [of 
science]." In other words, all true science must have a rational as 
well as an empirical part. Experience provides the empirical data; 
mathematics provides the inherently rational relationships between 
these data. But psychology could never utilize mathematics, according 
to Kant, because its empirical data do not have spatial dimensions 
and therefore exist only in the single dimension of time. Therefore, 
"unless one might want to take into consideration merely the law 
of continuity in the flow of ... internal changes," mathematics 
could not be applied to purely mental phenomena. As a result, 
psychology could "become nothing more than a systematic art ... 
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never a science proper; for ... [it is] merely empirical." By "merely 
empirical" Kant meant that psychology had to depend entirely upon 
an inductive, or a posteriori, collection of data. Such a procedure 
can never yield apodictic knowledge because it contains no a priori, 
necessary elements. Instead it can lead only to tentative "laws of 
experience." 11 
The designation of psychology as "merely empirical" did not 
mark the end to Kant's critique. In the same preface to the same 
work he said that not only is psychology "merely empirical," it is 
not even a good empirical discipline. Psychology suffers, Kant 
pointed out, "because in it the manifold of internal observation 
is separated only by mere thought, but cannot be kept separate and 
be connected again at will." In brief, psychology cannot control its 
phenomena; it cannot be "experimental." Furthermore, psychology 
suffers from the poor quality and restricted range of the observations 
that are available to psychologists. On the one hand, "the [act of] 
observation itself alters and distorts the state of the object [i.e., the 
mental phenomenon] observed"; on the other, "still less does another 
thinking subject submit to our investigations in such a way as to be 
conformable to our purposes." Thus, psychologists can only report 
on their own mental phenomena, and even then they cannot be 
completely accurate in their reports.12 
Such was the negative part of Kant's critique of "merely empi-
rical" psychology. Psychology, in short, could never become a truly 
rational science, based upon mathematics and yielding necessary 
truths, nor could it become an experimental science. Kant could 
see no way to change this verdict, but he did see a way in which 
psychology could at least become a better empirical science. There-
fore, in the third and final stage of his critique of psychology, Kant 
advocated the reformation of empirical psychology. Psychology 
should, he said, make use of a different methodology, a so-called 
"anthropological" methodology based upon observations of the 
external rather than internal sense. He set forth this thesis in his 
Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798), claiming that 
psychology, although remaining "merely empirical," could become 
more useful to humanity if it would forsake its traditional intro-
spective method and begin to make systematic observations of men 
and women "in the world" as they behave and interrelate with their 
fellow citizens. Such knowledge of"human nature" as can be gathered 
in this manner, and supplemented by "travelling, or at least reading 
travelogues" (as Kant avidly did), and by such "auxiliary means" as 
the study of "world history, biography, and even plays and novels," 
could be distilled, Kant said, into "laws of experience" that would 
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assist men and women in the course of their lives. Knowing better 
how humans tend to behave and how they tend to react to certain 
behaviors, individuals could make better choices about their own 
best course of action. This was a sufficient justification, in Kant's 
opinion, for developing an empirical psychology based upon external 
rather than internal observations.13 On this positive and prophetic 
note, Kant's critique of psychology came to an end. 
KANT'S PSYCHOLOGICAL DOCTRINES 
In view of Kant's recommendation of external observations in 
psychology, it is ironical that his own psychology, as presented in 
the Anthropologie as well as in other works, relied so heavily on 
traditional introspectionist data. In fact, the entire first part of the 
Arzthropologie (by far the larger of its two parts) was concerned with 
the classification and discussion of mental phenomena. Furthermore, 
the positive psychological doctrines that resulted from Kant's analyses 
of mental life had as great an impact on subsequent psychological 
thought as did the essentially negative conclusions of his critique of 
psychology. The nature of these positive psychological doctrines can 
be discussed in relation to three issues: the sources of knowledge, 
the nature of the mind (or ego), and the nature and functions of the 
psychological faculties. 
In reviewing the background to Kant's thought, we noted that 
Kant was stimulated at a crucial point in his intellectual development 
by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's distinction between sensibility and 
understanding. Though true, this does not mean that Kant accepted 
the orthodox, Leibnizian interpretation of this distinction. To Leibniz, 
as to Christian Wolff, sensations-including what we call perceptions-
are merely confused, indistinct thoughts; and, conversely, thoughts 
are merely sensory representations that have been clarified by rational 
analysis. Kant rejected this blurring of the distinction between sensi-
bility and understanding and established a radical separation that 
proved to be both stimulating and problematic for later philosophers 
and psychologists: for Kant, sensations and thoughts were two 
distinctly different kinds of things.14 
Kant was also influenced by the Leibnizian doctrine that the 
forms of knowledge are innate, whereas the content of knowledge 
must be acquired through experience. Kant's acceptance of this 
doctrine reflected his agreement with Leibniz's contention that 
1me sort of synthesis of rationalism and empiricism was necessary. 
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In applying Leibniz's distinction between form and content to his 
own radical distinction between sensibility and understanding, 
however, Kant once again went beyond the Leibnizian-Wolffian 
view of cognition. According to Kant, both sensibility and under-
standing, since they represent separate mental functions, must 
have their own formal-as well as contentual-characteristics. The 
senses, he concluded in his inaugural dissertation (1770), apprehend 
individual, concrete things, whereas the understanding takes these 
individual apprehensions and represer.ts them in terms of abstract 
concepts. Although the specific content of sensation comes from 
the outer world through the senses, our sensibility is such that we 
grasp this content, always and automatically, according to the 
formal characteristics of time and space. These characteristics, Kant 
contended, are supplied by the mind; they are in no way a part of 
the sensory content of our knowledge. Kant referred to the products 
of sensibility as "intuitions." Intuitions, by their nature, are always 
sensible. Concepts, on the other hand, are intelligible and are the 
product, not of intuition, but of thought, or understanding. Thought 
transforms intuitions by the spontaneous and instantaneous appli-
cation of such purely intellectual categories as possibility, existence, 
necessity, substance, and cause. The result is the generation of 
knowledge, properly so called.15 
This brief review of Kant's doctrine of the dual sources of 
knowledge leads us very naturally into a discussion of his doctrine 
about the nature of the mind, or ego. It should be apparent by now 
that for Kant the mind is fundamentally and irrevocably active. It 
participates in the production of action. As we have seen in the 
previous section of this essay, Kant did not believe that it is possible 
definitively to describe the transcendental, or ultimate, nature of the 
mind, but he did contend that the existence of the "I" (or ego) is 
guaranteed, since it is the necessary "formal condition" that makes 
possible "the logical unity of every thought." 16 Whereas the ego in 
and of itself cannot be an object of thought, some of its attributes 
can be known, Kant said, insofar as the ego is "the vehicle of all 
concepts." 17 Indeed, the very existence of our concepts presupposes 
the activity of the mind, and in particular the mind's capacity of 
instantaneous apperception. For Kant, apperception referred to the 
special type of synthesis that is brought about by the faculty of 
thought, or understanding. As we have seen, Kant did not agree with 
the empiricists who felt that higher mental phenomena, such as 
concepts, are merely the final products of a random and essentially 
passive process of association of sensations. He could not conceive 
how disparate sensations could, by chance, come to adhere in a 
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unified, structured manner. Instead, he viewed concepts as the basic, 
original "givens" of consciousness. Their existence, he said, rather 
than the existence of unorganized and thus meaningless sensations, is 
primary. We are first aware of unified states of mind; we secondarily 
analyze these states of mind into their elements. We never know 
these elements except as abstractions from our concepts. This was 
the reasoning behind Kant's doctrine of the primary "unity of 
consciousness." 18 
If his analysis of the nature of "pure reason," or knowledge, 
convinced Kant that the ego is both active and unitive, his analyses 
of both "practical reason" and "judgment" served to corroborate 
this emphasis many times over. As is commonly recognized, Kant's 
consideration of the application of reason in the realm of daily 
affairs was the culmination of his thought, and his discussion of 
the purposive character of "judgmental" thought and action put 
the finishing touches on the architectonic structure of his system 
of thought. The human person in action, freely making decisions 
and choosing his or her behavior, is the ultimate image of the human 
being that Kant wished to propose and defend. We shall return to 
this topic when we discuss Kant's doctrine of the will, a doctrine 
that profoundly influenced the subsequent development of German 
philosophy and psychology and had a definite impact on philosophers 
and psychologists in other countries. 
The final aspect of Kant's psychological thought that we shall 
review concerns his doctrine of the mental faculties. This doctrine 
is intertwined with the topics we have already considered, namely, 
Kant's theory of the sources of knowledge and his view of the nature 
of the mind. It is also intertwined with the legacy of pre-Kantian 
empirical psychology, as we have seen in our discussion of the 
background to Kant's thought. Despite this connection with previous 
psychological doctrines, however, we should not underestimate the 
extent of Kant's originality. Although Johann Nicolas Tetens and 
several others had already laid the foundation for a thoroughgoing 
tripartite analysis of mental activity, they had not distinguished 
the faculties of knowing, willing, and feeling quite so clearly and 
definitively as Kant was about to do. Nor had they given a clear 
rationale for the relationship between these various faculties. As 
a result, it was Kant, not they, who must be given credit for firmly 
establishing the tradition of tripartite functional analysis, a tradition 
that was to have a fundamental influence on later philosophical and 
psychological thought.19 
On the level of philosophical analysis, Kant distinguished three 
-.:ognitive faculties-understanding, reasoning, and judgment. He 
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discussed each of these faculties in turn in his three major works, 
namely, in Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781), Kritik der praktischen 
Vernunft (1788), and Kritik der Urtheilskraft (1790), respectively. 
Implicit within these works, and explicit in his lectures on psychology 
and in his Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798), were the 
three psychological faculties of cognition, desire, and feeling. Although 
he maintained a strict logical distinction between the philosophical 
and psychological levels of analysis, Kant himself indicated the 
consonance between his philosophical and psychological doctrines 
in the introduction to his Kritik der Urtheilskraft: the psychological 
processes of knowing, desiring, and feeling, he said, are directly 
related to the actual operation of the a priori faculties of under-
standing, reasoning, and judging.20 It was the third of these faculties-
feeling, or judging-that constituted Kant's most obvious addition to 
the tradition of functional analysis, but his treatment of the other 
two faculties was no less novel. 
The faculty of knowing, as we have already seen, operates on 
two levels, the lower level dealing with sensibility and the higher 
with conceptual understanding. In addition to the process of sensory 
intuition that we have already discussed, Kant maintained that 
there is a second lower cognitive process. This process, which he 
called imagination, can take place even in the absence of immediate 
sensation. It can either produce new sensuous images or reproduce 
images of former intuitions. In the latter process, Kant conceded, 
the mind is more passive than active, being governed by habits of 
association; but in the former process the mind is much more active 
and creative. In either case, higher cognition builds upon the work 
of the imagination in the same way that it completes the process 
of sensory intuition, that is, by categorizing the images formed 
by the lower faculty. As in the case of intuitions, the product of 
the categorization of images is conceptualization, or ideas. Thinking 
with ideas is, for Kant, simply one of the powers of the mind.21 
All this mental activity presupposes, for Kant, the a priori 
capacity of apperception and the existential fact of the unity of 
consciousness. Kant did not, however, limit his psychological vision 
to the realm of consciousness. In opposition to the empiricists, he 
endorsed the existence of unconscious ideas. Indeed, his discussion 
of the "degrees of consciousness" had notable historical consequences. 
In addition, Kant discussed various cognitive "deficiences" and 
"talents." Among the deficiencies he discussed mental illness, parti-
cularly-though not entirely-as it reflects the improper working of 
the rational mind; among the talents he discussed wit and the nature 
of genius. 22 
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In his treatment of practical reason, or the will, Kant wanted to 
demonstrate the basic freedom of the human person: so much so, in 
fact, that Kant's voluntarism is commonly considered the central 
nerve of his entire philosophical system. Given this fact, the central 
irony of Kant's thought is that, although he posed a brilliant argument 
for the a priori freedom of the human being, he was equally adamant 
in his insistence that this freedom is a function solely of the practical 
reason, or will, and can never be comprehended by pure reason, or 
understanding. After all, as Kant had previously argued in the Kritik 
der reinen Vemunft, one of the basic categories of comprehension 
is causality. Human beings necessarily comprehend antecedents and 
consequences as causes and effects: our minds simply work that 
way.23 As a result, since every act-even every free act-occurs in the 
context of a sequence of events over time, complete comprehension 
will always involve the specification of cause-effect relations. By 
arguing that these cause-effect relations are the product of mental 
analysis and do not necessarily describe the true state of nature, Kant 
was able to leave room for freedom in the world of human affairs. 
But this same argument also led him to present two diametrically 
opposed images of the human being-as free and as determined. 
The image of the human person as free, which, as we have said, 
was the ultimate image that he wished to propose and defend, was 
presented by Kant in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. His 
argument for this freedom was completely philosophical, based on 
a logical analysis of the necessary prerequisites for moral life. The 
image of the human person as determined was presented in his 
Anthropologie, where he spoke not of a transcendental will but of 
the related psychological faculty of desire. According to Kant, in 
the context of actual empirical conditions, the "choices" of human 
beings are always preceded (and thus appear to be determined) by 
human appetites, inclinations, passions, habits, and instincts. Going 
one step further, Kant followed his own earlier advice to empirical 
psychologists and observed humans "externally," noting, classifying, 
and correlating their behavior with certain visible characteristics, 
sexual types, nationalities, racial origins, and human qualities. His 
conclusions, published in the second part of the Anthropologie, 
were consistent with his conviction that understanding-including 
psychological understanding-must necessarily be formulated in 
causal terms.24 
Since freedom, the ultimate characteristic of human nature, is 
beyond the cognitive grasp of the human mind, it followed for Kant 
that the perspective of psychology must necessarily be incomplete, 
or limited. Empirical psychology can only provide tentative knowl-
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edge of the conditions of human choice, no more. Only the philo-
sophical analysis of the practical demands of reason can reveal human 
freedom. About the psychodynamics of that freedom nothing can 
be said. In fact, to speak of the psychodynamics of freedom would 
be a contradiction in terms. Thus, in essence, Kant viewed the will 
as a noumenal reality behind the appearances of sense, knowledge, 
feeling, and appetite. Although this view is explicitly nonpsycho-
logical, Kant's doctrine of the will was to have broad repercussions 
within German psychology-as well as within philosophy-in the 
nineteenth century. 
Kant saw the third psychological faculty, that of feeling, as 
intermediate between knowing and desiring, just as he saw judgment, 
its transcendental cognitive analog, as intermediate between under-
standing-that is, pure reason-and reason-that is, practical reason, 
or will. The most basic feelings, according to Kant, are pleasure 
and pain. Furthermore, pleasure and pain may be either sensuous, 
intellectual, or moral. Sensuous feelings accompany intuitions and 
imaginations; intellectual feelings accompany concepts or ideas; 
and moral feelings accompany desires. The significant point is that, 
although Kant made an analytic distinction between knowing, 
desiring, and feeling, he denied that the various phenomena of these 
faculties exist in isolation from one another. Cognitive intuitions, 
images, and concepts, as well as moral desires, are all attended by 
affective components. This analysis is quite different from that of 
Leibnizian psychology in which feelings are only confused ideas. 
According to Kant, even a clear idea is associated with an affective 
pleasure or pain.25 
This interrelation of the various types of psychological phe-
nomena is further illustrated by Kant's analysis of the phenomena of 
aesthetic taste. This special type of feeling, which he considered 
"partly sensuous, partly intellectual," fascinated Kant, and he 
investigated it at length because it implicitly involves processes 
analogous to, and substitutive for, both cognition and volition. On 
the one hand, like cognition, it involves a process of judgment, 
though not a strictly rational judgment. Instead it involves the 
kind of judgment that is passed by the feelings: a judgment of 
whether something is agreeable or disagreeable, a pleasure or pain. 
On the other hand, like the determinations of the will, these non-
cognitive judgments-that is, pleasures and pains-possess motiva-
tional powers. They can obstruct both the clarity of understanding 
and the resolve of the will, and they can thus lead to the commission 
of behaviors opposed by the will. Yet the feelings can also be enlisted 
in the service of morality if the feeling of pleasure is associated with 
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the idea of the good and thus helps the will toward its proper object. 
Therefore, Kant hoped that the arts and literature would arouse 
beneficial feelings that would motivate human beings to make 
proper moral choices. At the same time, however, he did not think 
that the feelings could be of service to the cognitive processes. 
Indeed, he thought that these processes, to function properly, must 
be disturbed by the feelings as little as possible. In espousing this 
doctrine, Kant revealed that he had not entirely abandoned the 
intellectualism of Leibniz and Wolff. Feelings, he thought, are apt 
to become pathological and ought not to be left untended.26 
Still, despite this contention, Kant clearly felt that all the 
psychological faculties continually interact. In fact, it is important 
to end this discussion of the three faculties by emphasizing that 
Kant did not mean to reify these faculties into metaphysically 
distinct entities. Although he did argue that the cognitive processes 
of understanding, reasoning, and judging are in principle distinct, 
Kant asserted that these faculties are as essentially related as the 
three steps of a syllogism. And, on the psychological level, Kant 
insisted that knowing, desiring, and feeling are continuously inter-
twined. Thus he conceived the three faculties as various aspects of 
the unitary functioning of the mind.27 For better or worse, the 
philosophers and psychologists who came after him tended to 
focus on one or the other of these aspects and tried to recast the 
Kantian heritage by subordinating the other parts of that heritage 
to this single aspect. Often this meant taking one of Kant's faculties 
as fundamental and treating the others as somehow dependent upon, 
or derivative from, it. But even so, in accepting Kant's analysis as 
the framework for further discussions of mental activity, even those 
who opposed the very notion of a tripartite faculty psychology 
remained within the field of Kant's influence. 
KANT'S HERITAGE 
In the ferment of thought that occurred in Kant's wake, idealism 
came to the fore and dominated philosophical speculation in Germany 
for half a century. The major idealists-Johann Gottlieb Fichte 
(1762-1814), Friedrich Wilhelm von Schelling (1775-1854), and 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1 770-1831)-took their points of 
departure from the work of Kant, though they were among those 
who emphasized different aspects of his thought and developed 
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forms of metaphysical idealism that far exceeded the narrow bounds 
of Kant's critical idealism. As regards the critique of psychology, 
however, they were in perfect agreement with Kant's contention 
that psychology is not, and cannot become, a true science. Like 
Kant, they regarded psychology as a "merely empirical" science; but, 
unlike Kant, they believed that this tentative preliminary science 
could be transformed and completed by philosophical thought. In 
many ways, then, they revived the spirit of earlier rational psychol-
ogy, disregarding Kant's strictures about the limits of rational analysis. 
Nonetheless, in the course of their philosophical work they helped 
to propagate many of Kant's psychological doctrines, primarily 
through the publications of their psychologist disciples.28 
The central focal point of Kant's thought was his analysis of 
the innate structure and functioning of the human mind. Even 
during Kant's lifetime, Karl Leonhard Reinhold argued persuasively 
that the Kantian concern about the nature of the mind-or, as 
Reinhold preferred to call it, "consciousness"-should be the funda-
mental issue for philosophy. The systematic description, or "phenom-
enology," of consciousness, he said, should be the immediate task 
of the post-Kantian generation.29 Toward this end, Reinhold founded 
one of the most vital centers of Kantian thought at the University 
of Jena. Even before Kant's death in 1804, Reinhold's pupils and 
colleagues-including Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel-were already 
establishing the phenomenology of consciousness as the basic topic 
in German philosophy. 
Fichte's elaboration of the concept of consciousness led him 
to an idealistic view of consciousness as an ever-active, striving ego, 
which is ultimately manifested as will. 30 His basic principles of 
egoism, activism, and voluntarism, deduced originally as principles 
of Absolute Reality, were used in psychological analyses by a number 
of his followers, including G. E. A. Mehmel and Karl Fortlage.3 t They 
also influenced Hermann von Helmholtz, particularly as regards 
his historically important theory of the active role of the mind in 
perception.32 And when Wilhelm Wundt characterized his psychology 
as voluntaristic in nature, he clearly indicated the extent to which 
his "New Psychology" was premised on an acceptance of the Fichtean 
revision of traditional Leibnizian intellectualism.33 Corroborated by 
the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, this new voluntaristic 
temper had a broad impact on the psychological thinking of the late 
nineteenth century. It is apparent that Sigmund Freud, among many 
others, was affected by this general movement of thought, especially 
insofar as certain evolutionary and dynamic conceptions were 
grafted onto it. 
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Schelling's considerations of consciousness led him to discussions 
of the unconscious as a necessary antecedent and corollary of con-
sciousness as well as to discussions of the concepts of personality 
and genius. It also led him to propagate Identitatsphilosophie, or the 
philosophy of identity, which espoused the Spinozistic doctrine that 
mind and body are but two aspects of the same reality. 34 When 
applied to psychology, this doctrine suggested that the nature and 
activity of the mind is reflected in the structure and functioning of 
the body. This proved to be a fruitful suggestion. Not only did it 
inspire the psychological investigations of Karl Friedrich Burdach, 
Karl Gustav Carus, and others, it also stimulated the development 
of psychophysics by Gustav Theodor Fechner, the person most often 
credited with bringing actual measurement into the realm of psychol-
ogy. 35 As Fechner himself admitted, the inspiration of his ground-
breaking study of the relationship between conscious experience 
and physical stimulation came from the Naturphilosophie of Lorenz 
O_ken. Oken, in tum, had been inspired by Schelling.36 Thus, psycho-
physics, one of the major foundations of modern psychology, is 
historically rooted within the conceptual framework of post-Kantian 
idealism. 
Schelling also introduced a strong genetic, or developmental, 
emphasis into the thinking of his followers. This led to the publication 
of books such as Gotthilf Heinrich van Schubert's popular Geschichte 
der Seele (History of the Soul) (1830) and Karl Gustav Carus's 
Psyche: Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Seele (Psyche: Toward a De-
velopmental History of the Soul) (1846). 37 Carus's work was par-
ticularly significant because of his position as a comparative anatomist 
and physiologist. As early as 1831, in his Vorlesungen -Uber Psychologie 
(Lectures on Psychology), Carus combined his genetic approach to 
psychology with a scientific knowledge of the physiological develop-
ment of the nervous system. Later, taking the logic of the philosophy 
of identity and of the genetic principle one step further, Carus made a 
major contribution by espousing, and developing, comparative psy-
chology, that is, the study of the historical development of con-
sciousness through the animal kingdom, leading up to man. 38 Since 
his work was based largely on physiology, he also contributed to the 
development of physiological psychology. 
Hegel had a more highly developed and formalized psychology 
than either Fichte or Schelling. He presented this psychology as part 
of his Philosophie des Geistes (Philosophy of Mind) (1830).39 Among 
the many notable aspects of this psychology is its reliance on, and 
reverence for, Aristotle's psychology. This helped to spark a revival 
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of Aristotelian studies in Germany, a revival that, especially through 
the teaching of Friedrich Adolf Trendelenberg, had a profound impact 
on Wilhelm Dilthey, Franz Brentano, and other notable contributors 
to the development of psychological thought. 40 
Another important aspect of Hegel's view of psychology was his 
conviction that psychology describes, and can only describe, the 
empirical conditions and experiences of the mind. In this, of course, 
he was in agreement with Kant. Going beyond Kant, however, he 
argued that the study of the "subjective" mind can and must be 
transcended, just as the individual mind itself is transcended, and 
develops beyond mere sense-dependence, by its immersion in a larger 
"objective," or group, mind. In other words, the study of the "I" 
must be followed by the study of the "we," which, in turn, leads to 
the study of the Absolute Mind. The important point is that Hegel 
formalized an insight that was implicit in the work of Johann Georg 
Hamann, Johann Gottfried Herder, and others: the social level of 
analysis, he claimed, transcends that of the individual. Beyond that, 
he prescribed the study of the social, or objective, mind by means 
of its products, such as language, law, custom, and myth. This 
Hegelian doctrine was an important influence upon the development 
of the social psychological perspective, especially as formulated in 
Volkerpsychologie (cultural, or "folk," psychology). Although he 
denied any direct influence by Hegel, Wilhelm Wundt was working 
a field prepared by Hegel when he spent several decades writing his 
multivolumed Volkerpsychologie (1900-20). Clearly, he agreed 
with Hegel when he claimed that the higher mental processes, involving 
the truly human, symbolic aspects of experience, can only be under-
stood within a social context, using a nonexperimental methodology. 
In reaching this conclusion, Wundt lent his considerable authority 
to a distinction developed by the neo-Kantians of the latter part of 
the nineteenth century, namely, the distinction between psychology 
as a natural science (or Naturwissenschaft) and psychology as a social 
science (or Geisteswissenschaft). This distinction was to have particular 
significance in the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries.41 
One other notable aspect of Hegel~s psychology was its develop-
ment of the principle of self-actualization. In the Hegelian scheme, 
the fullness of development is reached only by participation in the 
Absolute, which Hegel's disciples often described by using the 
"mythological" concept of "Personality." This notion of actuali-
zation as a process leading toward the establishment of personality 
began an historical tradition of thought that led through Kurt 
Goldstein and Carl Gustav Jung to contemporary humanistic psychol-
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ogy. The correlative development in the Fichte-inspired voluntarist 
tradition led to a focusing on the development of "character," as 
eventually seen in the work of Wundt and Freud.42 
Hegel's was the last of the major idealist systems, and it domi-
nated the philosophical scene in Germany through the 1830s and 
even beyond. Among his followers were the psychologists Johann 
Eduard Erdmann, Leopold George, Carl Ludwig Michelet, Johann 
Georg Mussmann, Franz Vorfander, and Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz.43 
The work of Erdmann, published into the 1880s, shows the resilience 
of this tradition of thought. Although the works of these Hegelian 
psychologists are rather diverse, one common characteristic was their 
reliance on dialectical analysis, as propagated by Hegel. In several 
respects, their analyses presaged those of recent so-called dialectical 
psychologists. These latter individuals, however, typically refer to Karl 
Marx, or to various Russian psychologists such as S. L. Rubinstein, 
as the inspiration of their work.44 Nonetheless, Hegelian dialectics 
is the historical foundation of their work. 
For all their variations on the theme of consciousness, we can 
summarize the influence of the idealists on the development of 
psychology rather succinctly: (1) They made "consciousness" the 
primary subject matter, and problem, of psychology. As we have 
seen, Fechner developed psychophysics under the influence of the 
idealist thesis that consciousness is correlative with physical reality. 
Similarly, Wundt defined the subject matter of his new experimental, 
or "physiological," psychology as "the manifold of consciousness. " 45 
Although the empirical and experimental procedures that he proposed 
for the investigation of the lower forms of consciousness came from 
the natural scientific tradition, the object of study was clearly from 
the idealist tradition. Thus, both Fechner and Wundt, the two 
reputed founders of modem psychology, belonged to a broader 
intellectual tradition that developed in mid-to-late-nineteenth-century 
Germany, that is, the tradition of Idealrealismus. Participants in 
this tradition, including also Rudolph Hermann Lotze and Wilhelm 
Dilthey, attempted to combine the essential insights of both idealism 
and realism while avoiding the exclusive dogmatism of either. (2) 
Related to the issue of consciousness, the idealists spread a concern 
about the nature and development of the ego, personality, will, and 
character. The egoism and voluntarism thus sponsored had broad 
consequences in subsequent psychological thought. ( 3) The idealists 
emphasized the uniqueness and preeminence of the social psycho-
logical level of analysis. The antiindividualistic temper of their work 
clearly influenced the development of Volkerpsychologie and helped 
to increase the general sensitivity regarding the historical-cultural 
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context of personality development. This latter sensitivity was 
reflected in the psychological histories of Dilthey and others. Even 
Freud's sensitivity to the social context of personality development 
can be seen as a part of this idealist heritage.46 ( 4) In addition to 
inspiring psychophysics and encouraging special methods for social 
psychological analyses, the idealists also had an impact on the 
development of genetic and comparative methodologies. Although 
the empirical rigor of later studies was usually missing in their work, 
they did prepare the way conceptually for these later studies. The 
idealist notion of "the history of consciousness" was implicated in 
many of the early works of the first generation of scientific psy-
chologists. Wundt's Vorlesungen uber die Menschen- und Thierseele 
(Lectures on the Human and Animal Mind) (1863) are instructive 
in this regard since they exemplify how Darwinian thought was often 
assimilated in Germany through an essentially naturalized idealist 
framework. 47 
Despite these important contributions, it is nonetheless true 
that the idealists opposed the development of psychology as an 
autonomous discipline, and especially as a scientific discipline. In 
this respect, as regards the development of modem scientific psychol-
ogy, a different group of post-Kantians was instrumental-the group 
of post-Kantian empirical philosophers composed of Jakob Friedrich 
Fries (1773-1843), Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), and 
Friedrich Eduard Beneke (1778-1854). Each member of this group 
clearly expressed his allegiance to Kant and his disagreement with 
idealism; each of them also went beyond orthodox Kantianism in 
order to "complete" Kant's system of thought. What characterized 
their work as a group was its consistent empiricism, even if this 
was supplemented at times by rational analysis and metaphysics. 
Although each of them also helped to propagate some of Kant's 
constructive doctrines, it was their development of the general 
conception of an autonomous, scientific psychology that constituted 
their major contribution as a group. Ironically, they based their 
thinking in this regard on Kant's critique of psychology.48 
When Kant specified that psychology could never become a true 
science because it could not utilize any a priori notions, any mathe-
matics, or any experimental techniques, he inadvertently proposed 
a prescription for those who wanted to develop psychology into 
a scientific discipline. Following Kant's direction, Fries argued that 
psychology can evolve a set of rational concepts to guide its theoretical 
work; Herbart devised a mathematical psychology, even if an ill-fated 
one; and Beneke proposed a set of experiments and ardently advocated 
the establishment of a truly experimental psychology.49 Successively 
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building on the work of their predecessors and keeping an eye on 
Kant's definition of science, these three thinkers developed the 
conception of psychology to the point where subsequent experimental 
physiologists, such as Wilhelm Wundt, were inspired to call their 
research-and perhaps more importantly to think of their research 
-as "psychology." Certainly it was not inevitable that Wundt and 
others would conceptualize their work in this way. (Hermann von 
Helmholtz, for instance, had not done so.) Theirs, after all, was 
a kind of psychology unlike that which had preceded it-except in 
the minds of the three empirical philosophers who had provided 
a conceptual foundation and who had argued for a scientific psychol-
ogy. It was therefore fitting that, in the 1860s, the term Beneke had 
coined twenty years before-namely, the "New Psychology"-came 
to designate the work of Wundt and his contemporaries.so 
In essence, we have traced the development of two traditions 
of thought, both preceeding from Kant and both leading to the 
psychology of the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries. From 
the idealist line of development came the conception of the proper 
subject matter of psychology as well as certain theoretical and 
methodological orientations. From the empiricist line came the 
general definition of natural scientific psychology. In combination, 
and together with the judicious adoption of research, methods, 
and theory from the field of sensory phsyiology (which was also 
influenced by the Kantian heritage, as for instance in the work of 
Johannes Muller and Hermann von Helmholtz), these lines of develop-
ment ushered in a new period in the history of psychology. In this 
new period the Kantian heritage was apparent in even more ways 
than we have already noted: The Kantian doctrine of sensibility, 
with its stipulation of the innate forms of time and space, led to the 
so-called "Kant-Muller-Hering-Mach-Stumpf line of descent" that 
propagated the law of specific sense energies and the theory of 
nativistic space perception.s 1 The Kantian doctrine of intelligibility 
had, among its long-range effects, the setting of the theoretical 
context for the Wti.rzburgers' declaration of "the rules of conscious-
ness." The Kantian doctrines of apperception and the unity of 
consciousness likewise influenced the thinking of Wundt and others 
and advanced the theoretical tradition leading up to the work of 
the Gestalt psychologists. Similarly, as regards the concept of the 
unconscious, Kant's doctrine influenced Herbart, Schopenhauer, 
Nietzsche, and von Hartmann and, through them, Freud. Finally, as 
regards the relative autonomy of feeling, Kant's doctrine influenced 
the turning away from an overemphasis on reason and ideas in 
psychology. Together with his concern about practical reason, or 
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the will, this helped to bring about a broadening of the empirical, 
conceptual, and theoretical range of psychology. 
In addition, Kant's heritage extended far beyond the borders 
of Germany. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, French 
philosophy was dominated by Kantian thought, with subsequent 
effects on the developmental psychology of Jean Piaget. Likewise, 
British philosophy was deeply influenced by German idealism later 
in the century, and the influence of Kant was reflected in the activistic 
self-psychology of James Ward. Even earlier in the century, the 
influence of Kant was felt within the British psycho-physiological 
tradition through the impact of Johann Friedrich Blumenback upon 
the thinking of Thomas Laycock. Furthermore, there is good reason 
to suppose that the distinction between logic and psychology, so 
critical in the development of psychology in Britain, was influenced 
by Kantian thought. 
Just as striking was the influence of Kant in the United States, 
which was evident early in the nineteenth century in the work of 
Frederic Rauch and Laurens Hickok and was reflected later in the 
work of Charles Peirce and William James. Often Kant's influence 
was indirect as well as direct: William James and George Trunball 
Ladd, like many of their British counterparts, were deeply influenced 
by the Idealrealistic Kantianism of Rudolph Hermann Lotze. In 
addition, James was also influenced at a critical point and in a critical 
way by the French neo-Kantian Charles Renouvier. James's subsequent 
emphasis upon the will as well as his fundamental conception of the 
active, "interested" mind are the direct consequences of these 
encounters with Kantianism. Slightly later, G. Stanley Hall, Josiah 
Royce, James Mark Baldwin, John Dewey, and George Herbert 
Mead were influenced in essential ways by German idealism. The 
dialectical modes of thought implicit in so much of their work would 
be inexplicable without their early contact with the idealistic branch 
of the Kantian heritage. Another mediated path of influence, which 
reached the United States only in the twentieth century, ran from 
the neo-Kantian Wilhelm Dilthey through Eduard Spranger to Gordon 
Allport, to the field of personality psychology, and eventually to 
Humanistic Psychology .52 
CONCLUSION 
Although these latter brush strokes are very broad, they should 
provide a general picture of the extent to which Kant laid the founda-
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tion for subsequent psychological thought. One final aspect of Kant's 
heritage, perhaps its central aspect, should be indicated once again 
at the conclusion of this essay. This aspect represents the major 
problem that Kant bequeathed to posterity. He did not invent this 
problem, but he did give it a poignant expression, and it underlies 
his entire system of thought. Simply stated, it is the problem of the 
place of the will in a deterministic world. In broader terms, this is 
the traditional problem of "man's place in nature"; in psychological 
terms it is the problem of the accommodation of "consciousness" 
to scientific method. Kant himself saw an irreconcilable difference 
between these pairs of concepts-between will and world, "man" 
and nature, mind and science. Later psychologists sought to reconcile 
these differences by either eliminating or changing the definition of 
one of these terms-as the behaviorists and humanists have done, to 
"consciousness" and "science" respectively-or by devising a practical 
compromise between them--as Fechner, Wundt, and many of their 
successors have done. The historical record shows that none of these 
solutions has worked for very long. The borders and territory of 
"consciousness"-including its putative extensions into unconscious-
ness-have never been mapped in a way that is satisfying for two 
consecutive generations. 
Kant himself might have pointed out that the problem is innate 
rather than accidental. The attempt to submit a subject matter 
developed with the idealist tradition to the scrutiny of methods 
often taken from the naturalist tradition is bound to be frustrated. 
As capitulatory as it may seem, the conclusion of Hugo Munsterberg, 
a neo-Kantian as well as a student of Wundt and director of the 
Harvard Psychological Laboratory between 1892 and 1916, is 
consonant with Kant's own opinion: there may simply be two ways 
of looking at the world of human experience, as free and as deter-
mined. Freedom can be seen as a practical fact; determinism as a fact 
of knowledge.53 The alternatives to accepting this dualistic point of 
view may be either the continuation of one-sided dogmatisms and 
temporary compromises, or the establishment of an entirely new 
tradition of thought, in which both subject matter and method are 
conceived anew. In any case, until we are fully aware of the extent 
to which we continue to stand on the foundation that Kant laid 
two hundred years ago, we may not see the choice that faces us. 
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